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Such Stuff as Laws Are Made On:
Interpreting the Exchange Act to Reach
Transnational Fraud
Katherine J. Fickt
Securities fraud is often transnational in nature, implicating
parties and markets far beyond the territorial boundaries of the
United States.1 Entities routinely look abroad to raise and invest
capital, and transacting parties do not confine their preparatory
activities within national borders.' The antifraud provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' ("Exchange Act") have force
in what is now a fundamentally global marketplace.4
Recognizing the "national public interest"5 entwined with the
securities markets of the United States, Congress enacted the
Exchange Act to address the problems then plaguing the domes-
tic economy.' Congress made this legislative move without explic-
itly mentioning how the Act was to apply extraterritorially.7 In-
t B.A. 1999, Calvin College; J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Chicago.
1 See Marc I. Steinberg, International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Com-
parative Analysis xvii (Kluwer Law Intl 1999) (noting the recent "perpetration of wide-
spread cross-border [securities] fraud").
2 See Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Report of the Staff of the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce 11-5 (July 27,
1987) ("Vast amounts of capital are now being raised internationally; the world's econo-
mies are more interdependent; and economic, technological and regulatory changes are
altering the international financial landscape in an unprecedented manner.").
3 15 USC §§ 78a et seq (1994).
4 See Steinberg, International Securities Law at xvii (cited in note 1) ("Rapid techno-
logical advances, the globalization of the securities markets ... and the proliferation of
emerging capital markets are key developments that energize the importance of interna-
tional financial law. This phenomenon will increase in significance and intensity in the
twenty-first century.").
5 15 USC § 78(b)'(1994) ("For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in
securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter mar-
kets are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for
regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto.").
6 See Part IA.
7 See MCG, Inc v Great Western Energy Corp, 896 F2d 170, 173 (5th Cir 1990)
("When Congress drafted the securities laws, it did not consider the issue of extraterrito-
rial applicability, requiring that the federal courts fill the void."). See also Gregory K.
Matson, Note & Comment, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over Transna-
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ternational securities transactions are now commonplace,8 and
foreign investors alleging securities fraud find the applicable laws
of the United States attractive As Congress has not amended
the Exchange Act to address its transnational scope, American
courts must make these jurisdictional decisions without the bene-
fit of clear legislative guidance.
When deciding whether to exercise subject matter jurisdic-
tion over a claim brought by a foreign plaintiff alleging securities
fraud, a court applies the "effects" test,10 the "conduct" test," or a
combination of the two.12 To satisfy the effects test, federal circuit
courts generally agree that the fraudulent activity must have
harmed a United States market or investor. 3 Courts do not apply
the conduct test with the same level of uniformity. 4 Some grant
subject matter jurisdiction narrowly under the test, 5 while others
tional Securities Fraud, 79 Georgetown L J 141, 141 (1990) ("The judicial activity has its
origins in the curious silence of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... on the issue of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.").
8 See Steinberg, International Securities Law at 1 (cited in note 1) (discussing the
internationalization of the securities markets and noting that "[t]he 1980s and 1990s have
witnessed the advent of a truly global marketplace").
9 See Paige Keenan Willison, Note, Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders v Ban-
que Paribas London: Zero Steps Forward and Two Steps Back, 33 Vand J Transnatl L 469,
471 (2000) (explaining that "foreign victims of securities violations are tempted to seek
recovery in the United States, rather than in their own countries"). As Keenan Willison
notes, American securities laws offer foreign plaintiffs the benefits of comprehensive li-
ability standards, a competent judiciary, and the ability to enforce judgments. Id at 471.
See also Joel Seligman, The Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Preface to a
Symposium, 9 Mich YB Intl Legal Stud 1, 13 (1988) (comparing the United States to Can-
ada and the United Kingdom and concluding that, among the three, "the United States
has the most comprehensive liability provision concerning the sale of securities"); Interna-
tionalization of the Securities Markets at 1-2 (cited in note 2) ("[Tlhere are significant
differences among the regulations in different nations, in terms of nature, purpose, and
degree of protection."). These differences suggest that the securities laws of the United
States are not attractive to all foreigners. See Steinberg, International Securities Laws at
35 (cited in note 1) ("[TIhe perceived complexity of the U.S. regulatory system, coupled
with concerns about the level of disclosure required have made the U.S. securities mar-
kets somewhat less attractive to foreign issuers.").
10 See Part II B.
11 Soe Part II C.
12 See Part II D.
13 See, for example, Robinson v TCII US West Cable Communications, Inc, 117 F3d
900, 905 (5th Cir 1997) ("The courts that have previously addressed this problem have
created two basic tests for subject matter jurisdiction," the conduct test and the effects
test, the latter of which "asks whether conduct outside the United States has had a sub-
stantial adverse effect on American investors or securities markets.").
14 See id ("The circuits are divided as to precisely what sort of activities are needed to
satisfy the conduct test.").
15 See Zoelsch v Arthur Andersen & Co, 824 F2d 27, 31 (DC Cir 1987) ("[A more
restrictive test, such as the Second Circuit's, provides the better approach to determining
when American courts should assert jurisdiction in a case such as this."); Europe and
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confer it broadly." The Second Circuit recently added confusion to
this already unsettled area of the law in Europe and Overseas
Commodities Traders, SA v Banque Paribas London7 ("EOC").
There, the court held that a transient foreign investor could not
establish subject matter jurisdiction under the conduct test ab-
sent additional "tipping factors.""
Securities cases laced with foreign elements pose an interpre-
tive dilemma for courts applying the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act.'9 Courts have traditionally used the analytical
framework of intentionalism ° or purposivism,21 relying on the
supposed wishes of the enacting Congress to determine the extra-
territorial application of the Exchange Act.22
Overseas Commodities Traders, SA v Banque Paribas London, 147 F3d 118, 129 (2d Cir
1998), cert denied, 52 US 1139 (1999) (holding that "activity in the United States that is
'merely preparatory' to a securities fraud elsewhere will not implicate our antifraud laws"
under the conduct test and introducing the additional requirement of tipping factors when
both parties are foreign, on the view that Congress did not intend to enact securities laws
with such a "broad reach"), quoting Itoba Ltd v LEP Group PLC, 54 F3d 118, 122 (2d Cir
1995); Kauthar SDN BHD v Sternberg, 149 F3d 659, 667 (7th Cir 1998) ("[Flederal courts
have jurisdiction over an alleged violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
when the conduct occurring in the United States directly causes the plaintiff's alleged loss
in that the conduct forms a substantial part of the alleged fraud and is material to its
success."), cert denied, 525 US 1114 (1999); MCG, 896 F2d at 175 (same).
16 See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Oilseeds, Inc, 592 F2d 409, 420
(8th Cir 1979) (finding jurisdiction under the conduct test when the conduct "was in
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its
accomplishment"). See also SEC v Kasser, 548 F2d 109, 114 (3d Cir 1977) (holding that
the conduct test is satisfied "where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent
scheme occurs within this country"); Grunenthal GmbH v Hotz, 712 F2d 421, 425 (9th Cir
1983) (adopting the Continental Grain test).
17 147 F3d 118 (2d Cir 1998).
18 Id at 129 (noting that although the domestic conduct "ordinarily would be sufficient
to support jurisdiction," the court would not find it where "the surrounding circumstances
show that no relevant interest of the United States was implicated").
19 See Katherine T. Wallace, Alfadda v. Fenn: Expanding the Reach of United States
Securities Laws 24 L & Pol in Intl Bus 993, 994 (1993) ("[N]othing in the language of the
anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act defines or limits the scope of their extraterrito-
rial application.").
20 This Comment uses "intentionalism" to refer to the school that "acknowledges that
legal language often does not 'speak for itself and holds that a court should act as the
legislature's faithful agent, interpreting a statute in light of what the drafters intended."
Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44
Am U L Rev 1717, 1741 (1995). For a more detailed discussion of intentionalism, see Part
IIA 1.
21 This Comment uses "purposivism" to refer to the school "in which the court first
reviews the statute, its context, and history to discern the statute's original purpose, then
applies the statute in light of that underlying purpose." Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statu-
tory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System Values, 21 Seton Hall Leg J
233, 283 (1997). For a more detailed discussion of purposivism, see Part II A 2.
22 See Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 F2d 974, 993 (2d Cir 1975). It was Judge
Henry J. Friendly who first articulated this inquiry in the context of the extraterritorial
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The Congress that courts look to for guidance under original-
ist methods was concerned with the depressed state of what was
a predominantly localized domestic economy.23 Nevertheless,
courts continue to seek the counsel of legislative ghosts on prob-
lems arising in a markedly global marketplace. This approach
has yielded confusingly disparate interpretations of congressional
motive and incoherent rules regarding the application of the Ex-
change Act.
Because both the text and legislative history of the Exchange
Act are indeterminate, some courts compliment these sources
with overt considerations of policy.24 Courts that explicitly weigh
such factors have granted jurisdiction under the conduct test lib-
erally. 5 In contrast, those courts ostensibly refusing to take pol-
icy concerns into account construe that test narrowly.26
This Comment maintains that a dynamic reading of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Exchange Act should supplant interpre-
tive methods that consider only remote congressional motive
without explicitly weighing evolutive policy factors. A broad ap-
plication of the conduct test is an approach better suited to the
transnational state of the current economic landscape. Part I dis-
cusses the historical background and relevant text of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. Beginning with a discussion of the originalist
theories courts have used to construe the antifraud provisions of
the Exchange Act, Part II then explores the consequences of the
jurisdictional tests courts have created through those methods.
application of the Exchange Act. Judge Friendly is widely regarded as "one of the leading
interpreters of the federal securities laws." Adena Exploration v Sylvan, 860 F2d 1242,
1252 (5th Cir 1988). See also Kasser, 548 F2d at 113 (noting that the Second Circuit's
docket offered Friendly the opportunity to author "the leading opinions which have delved
into the problem of jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases ... HT v Vencap,
Ltd and Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc") (internal citations omitted); Margaret V. Sachs,
Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputa-
tion, 50 SMU L Rev 777, 782 (1997) (explaining that the Second Circuit during Friendly's
era "provided a securities docket that was quantitatively large and qualitatively meaty").
23 See Bersch, 519 F2d at 993 ("The Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces
of legislation in the midst of the depression could hardly have been expected to foresee the
development of off-shore funds thirty years later.").
24 See Part III B.
25 See Kasser, 548 F2d at 116 ("From a policy perspective, and it should be recognized
that this case in a large measure calls for a policy decision, we believe that there are
sound rationales for asserting jurisdiction."); Continental Grain, 592 F2d at 421 (noting
that "the range of significant conduct" sufficient to satisfy jurisdiction ought to "be fairly
inclusive").
26 See Zoelsch, 824 F2d at 32 ("Were it not for the Second Circuit's preeminence in the
field of securities law, and our desire to avoid a multiplicity of jurisdictional tests, we
might be inclined to doubt that an American court should ever assert jurisdiction over
domestic conduct that causes loss to foreign investors.").
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Part III maintains that dynamic interpretation is better suited to
this inquiry than is originalism. Finally, Part IV interprets the
antifraud provisions dynamically in the context of their transna-
tional application, arguing for the adoption of the broad conduct
test in light of pertinent policy factors.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE SOURCE: THE EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Legislating in the midst of a Great Depression, Congress im-
plemented both the Exchange Act and its predecessor, the Securi-
ties Act of 1933,27 to address the collapse of the American econ-
omy." The antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act were silent
as to their extraterritorial application when Congress enacted
them in 1934.29 Their continued silence has created a daunting
interpretive challenge for both the bench and bar.
A. Historical Context and Legislative Impetus
The Congress that enacted the Securities Exchange Act did
so gasping for economic relief, having just passed through what
scholars would later identify as the worst period of the Great De-
pression.3 ° By 1934, after five years of assurances that an eco-
nomic turnaround was on its way, 31 Americans had come to view
27 15 USC §§ 77a et seq (1994).
28 The House of Representatives received what became the Exchange Act from the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, noting that "[tihe bill ... attempts to
change the practices of exchanges and the relationships between listed corporations and
the investing public to fit modern conditions .... [because] the lesson of 1921-30 is that
without changes they cannot endure." Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, HR Rep No 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 2, in 78 Cong Rec H 7702 (Apr 30, 1934).
See also Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 Stan L Rev 385, 408-09 (1990) ("[T]he central inspiration for the [Exchange] Act
was the combination of the bull market of the 1920s and the dramatic collapse that ended
it.").
29 See Bruce Angiolillo, The Power of the Federal Courts to Hear Securities Fraud
Claims Arising From International Transactions, in Securities Litigation 1999, at 469, 474
(PLI Corp Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No B-1136, 1999) ("One of the chal-
lenges for the federal courts and the securities bar today is to adapt and apply this now
65-year-old statute to contemporary fraud claims brought by foreign investors or alleging
fraudulent conduct committed abroad.").
30 See Vincent P. Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A History 307 (Harvard
1970) ("[Flrom July 1931 to March 1933, the depression was at its worst. All the economic
indexes plunged to unprecedented lows, and extraordinary suffering, misery, and humilia-
tion were brought to millions and millions of Americans.").
31 See id at 306 (discussing the excessive optimism that existed even though "[aifter
Tuesday's crash [in 1929] the stock market coasted slowly downward for two and a half
years, with occasional brief rises that were not maintained").
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financial experts as "fools or liars."" Both Congress and the
newly-elected President understood that restoring faith in the
domestic economy required changing the way Wall Street con-
ducted itself.33
The legislative history of the Exchange Act reflects underly-
ing concerns with both modernizing and restoring confidence in
the beleaguered domestic economy.3 4 The Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, the House Committee that reported
out the bill that became the Exchange Act, perceived the Act as
an "attempt[ I to change the practices of exchanges and the rela-
tionships between listed corporations and the investing public to
fit modern conditions."35 The House Committee Report accompa-
nying the bill states that "[tihe out-of-date unsuitability to post-
war conditions of a whole series of economic interrelationships of
which the stock exchanges are the nerve center has uncontrolla-
bly accentuated natural moderate fluctuations of our economic
system into mad booms and terrible depressions."36 As many be-
lieved that securities fraud caused the crashes,37 restoring popu-
lar faith in market integrity was a significant legislative prior-
32 See id ("Public confidence in financiers generally and in Wall Street bankerspar-
ticularly was shattered entirely as the stock market belied their every statement.").
33 See Thel, 42 Stan L Rev at 408-09 (cited in note 28) (noting that "stock exchange
legislation was inevitable once the public blamed the stock market crash for the Depres-
sion," for "by the time Franklin Roosevelt was elected president, most interested parties
recognized that the issue was not whether there would be stock exchange legislation, but
rather what form the legislation would take").
34 See id at 424-461 (examining the legislative history of § 10(b) and concluding that
'[als understood by the Exchange Act's contemporaries, including its drafters, sponsors,
and, in a sense, Congress itself, the Act declared a fundamental change in the relationship
between the public and the market"). See also Sidney G. Wigfall, Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: The Second Circuit's Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of the 1934 Exchange Act and Congressional Intent, 5 Touro Intl L Rev 233, 234
(1994) ("Congress evidenced, by its passage of the antifraud provisions, the United States'
broad national interest in maintaining the integrity of the country's securities markets.").
35 Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, HR Rep No 1383,
73d Cong, 2d Sess 2, in 78 Cong Rec H 7702 (Apr 30, 1934).
36 Id.
37 See 73d Cong, 2d Sess, in 78 Cong Rec S 8387 (May 9, 1934) (statement of Senator
Long) ("There is many a little man today who has lost his bank account because his money
was gambled on margin at the stock exchange [and does] ... not even have a chance to
make a gain" because financiers "are gambling with little people's money."). See also
James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman, and Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases
and Materials 6 (Aspen 3d ed 2001) ("Much of the hearings leading up to Congress' en-
actment of the securities laws was devoted to accounts of trading practices by unscrupu-
lous market manipulators. The hearings produced reports that the bull market of the
1920s was the heyday of the crooked stock pools."). But see id ("More recent examination
of market practices in the 1920s suggests that the congressional hearings greatly exagger-
ated the effect and existence of such abusive schemes, perhaps doing so for political pur-
poses.").
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ity.3 Congress ultimately concluded that bringing the markets
into the modern era required their comprehensive regulation. 9
B. The Character of Cross-Border Transactions in 1934
With the tattered state of the domestic economy as its impe-
tus, the Exchange Act is predictably silent on its application to
transnational securities transactions.4' The Congress of 1934
could not have foreseen the thoroughly interconnected global
marketplace 41 that the Act would come to regulate. While trans-
national trading and investment did exist when Congress drafted
the Exchange Act,42 the Great Depression seriously impeded such
advances.43 In an era when transnational securities transactions
were present but far from commonplace, 4 the legislative silence
38 See Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, Securities Regulation at 6 (cited in note 37)
("Investor interest and confidence in markets evaporated overnight, and for many stocks,
trading halted completely.").
39 See Schoenbaum v Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 206 (2d Cir 1968) ("The Act seeks to
regulate the stock exchanges and the relationships of the investing public to corporations
which invite public investment by listing on such exchanges."), revd on other grounds, 405
F2d 215 (2d Cir 1968) (en banc); Carosso, Investment Banking at 368 (cited in note 30)
("The Securities Act was the first of a group of laws aimed at reforming Wall Street. Its
intent was to force corporations and investment firms seeking funds from the public to
adopt higher standards of social responsibility.").
40 See Alfadda v Fenn, 935 F2d 475, 478 (2d Cir 1991) ("The Securities Exchange Act
is silent as to its extraterritorial application.").
41 See Keenan Willison, Note, 33 Vand J Transnatl L at 469 (cited in note 9)
("[i]nternational securities transactions have become the norm in today's globalized econ-
omy."). See also Aulana L. Peters and Andrew E. Feldman, The Changing Structure of the
Securities Markets and the Securities Industry: Implications for International Securities
Regulation, 9 Mich YB Intl Legal Stud 19, 20 (1988) (stating that "the U.S. securities
markets of today are as radically different from those of the 1960s, as those of the 1960s
were from those of the 1930s," and crediting the change to the fact that "the U.S. securi-
ties markets and their counterparts around the world have become unequivocally interna-
tional").
42 See Internationalization of the Securities Markets at 11-5 (cited in note 2) ("By the
close of the nineteenth century, technological advancements in cross-border communica-
tions had also led to transnational investment."); Margaret V. Sachs, The International
Reach of Rule 10b-5, 28 Colum J Transnatl L 677, 693 (1990) ('The 1920's also witnessed
substantial purchases of United States securities by foreign investors, following a pattern
that originated in the nineteenth century when European investors financed United
States railroads.").
43 See Internationalization of the Securities Markets at 11-5 (cited in note 2) (stating
that the Depression, as well as World War II, "greatly reduced opportunities for further
integration of international capital markets").
44 See id ("[W]hile internationalization of securities markets is not new, the rapidity
of its growth in the 1980's is unique."). See also Keenan Willison, Note, 33 Vand J Trans-
natl L at 471 (cited in note 9) ("While transnational flows of capital are not an entirely
new phenomenon, at the time that the United States enacted its securities laws in the
early 1930s securities transactions were primarily domestic.") (footnote omitted).
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on the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the Act 45 is hardly
surprising.46
C. Modern Economic Internationalization
Because Congress drafted the Exchange Act with an eye to-
ward repairing the domestic economy,47 its framework is poorly
suited for cases arising out of a global marketplace.48 The interna-
tionalization of the economy49 means that a disparate assortment
of national laws and regulations may surround any given trans-
action. The trend of market globalization, which began in the
1950s and 1960s,51 has picked up notable speed since 1980.52 In-
vestors routinely look abroad to raise capital and conduct trans-
45 See Zoelsch v Arthur Andersen & Co, 824 F2d 23, 29 (DC Cir 1987) (stating that "in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress said little that bears on th[e] issue" of its
extraterritorial application).
46 But see Matson, Note & Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 141 (cited in note 7) (re-
ferring to the silence of the Exchange Act on its extraterritorial application as "curious").
47 See Paul Hamilton, The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Securities Laws
Towards Initial Public Offerings Conducted Over the Internet 13 St John's J Legal Corn-
men 343, 343 (1998) ("The United States securities laws were originally enacted in 1933
and 1934 to preserve and protect domestic markets.") (footnotes omitted).
48 See Zoelsch v Arthur Andersen & Co, 824 F2d 23, 33 (DC Cir 1987) (recognizing
that in 1934 "[t]he web of international connections in the securities market was then not
nearly as extensive or complex as it has become").
49 See Internationalization of the Securities Markets at II-I (cited in note 2) ("The
world's securities markets play a much larger role in international capital formation than
they did just a few years ago.").
60 See Keenan Willison, Note, 33 Vand J Transnatl L at 469 (cited in note 9) (noting
that transnational securities transactions "necessarily implicate the laws of more than one
nation, thereby creating both conflict and confusion"); Seligman, 9 Mich YB Intl Legal
Stud at 10-13 (cited in note 9) (outlining the "substantial differences" among the securi-
ties regulations of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
51 See SEC, Request for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the
World Securities Markets, 50 Fed Reg 16302, 16302 (1985) ("There has been an increasing
tendency for securities to become traded internationally. The emergence of the Eurobond
market in 1963 was the vanguard of this internationalization process."). See also J. Mi-
chael Finger and Thomas D. Willett, Preface, Annals 9, 9 (1982) ("[T]he boom of world
output and trade that began in the 1950s and built its momentum through the 1960s was,
in large measure, the result of these American-led efforts to reduce restrictions on inter-
national trade and capital movements and to reestablish a basically liberal, market-
oriented international economy.").
52 See SEC, 50 Fed Reg at 16302 (cited in note 51) ("In recent years there has been an
increasing tendency for major securities to be traded not only in the capital market of
their country of origin, but also in other financial centers around the world."). See also
Peters and Feldman, 9 Mich YB Intl Legal Stud at 21 (cited in note 41) ("Approximately
twenty years ago, for economic reasons, issuers, investors and market professionals
started to look beyond their borders for business and investment opportunities .... These
desires resulted in occasional international securities transactions .... The continuing
advance of telecommunications and data processing technology provided accessible and
relatively inexpensive links between geographically separated issuers and investors.").
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actions. 3 When these transactions sour, courts must apply the
Exchange Act to an economic setting its drafters never envi-
sioned.54
D. The Indeterminacy of the Antifraud Provisions
of the Exchange Act
Most plaintiffs seeking extraterritorial application of the Ex-
change Act do so under the antifraud provisions of § 10," a sec-
tion that makes no overt mention of securities violations involv-
ing foreigners. 6 Section 10 applies to "any person" who uses in-
terstate commerce,57 defining interstate commerce to include
trade "between any foreign country and any State."58 One com-
mits fraud by, inter alia, using "any manipulative or deceptive
device" in relation to a securities purchase, regardless of whether
that security is registered on a national exchange.59 Under the
statute, the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") prescribes
antifraud laws in accordance with what is "necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."0
The text of the Exchange Act does not provide a clear answer
to the question of its extraterritorial application. What language
does exist can serve as the basis for two notably different jurisdic-
tional determinations. One conclusion opposes the transnational
reach of the statute, while the other supports it.
The first interpretation observes that nothing in the statu-
tory language of § 10 explicitly states that courts are to give the
53 See Internationalization of the Securities Markets at 11-3 (cited in note 2) ("The
global character of the securities markets is ... reflected in the rapid growth of transac-
tions by U.S. and foreign investors in markets outside the investor's home country.").
54 See Keenan willison, Note, 33 Vand J Transnatl L at 471 (cited in note 9) ("The
intense trend toward globalization in the past decade and the sharp upswing in transna-
tional securities transactions may require reconsideration of those laws.") (footnote omit-
ted).
55 See Norimasa Murano, Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2 Intl Tax & Bus Law 298, 298 (1984) ("Most of the
judicial activity in the area of extraterritorial application of United States securities laws
has been concerned with the application of antifraud provisions to the regulation of the
affairs of foreign companies and individuals.").
56 See Angiolillo, The Power of Federal Courts at 476 (cited in note 29) ("As the courts
repeatedly have observed, with one minor exception, Congress did not expressly authorize
the courts to hear securities fraud cases arising abroad.").
57 15 USC § 78j (1994 & Supp 2000).
58 15 USC § 78c(17) (1994 & Supp 2000).
69 15 USC § 78j(b).
60 Id.
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Act extraterritorial force. 1 This becomes relevant when coupled
with the presumption against extraterritoriality,12 a canon of con-
struction that assumes a statute applies only within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States. When determining
whether a statute overcomes this presumption, courts look to the
existence of anything in the statute or its legislative history
"which would lead to the belief that Congress entertained any
intention other than the normal one."64 With nothing in the lan-
guage of the Act to justify a departure from the norm, this inter-
pretation of the Exchange Act suggests that the statute should
not have extraterritorial effect.
Conversely, one could read the text of the Exchange Act to
authorize extremely broad extraterritorial application. 5 As ar-
ticulated in § 10(b), fraud involves the use of interstate com-
merce.6 Section 3(a)(17) of the Exchange Act defines "interstate
commerce" as including trade and communication not only
"among the several States," but also "between any foreign country
and any State."67 This reference to "foreign country," the argu-
ment runs, establishes congressional intent sufficient to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality.68 By implication, the
61 § 10(b) states that "lilt shall be unlawful for any person... by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange," to, inter alia, use any deceptive devices to defraud when buying or
selling securities. 15 USC § 78j (1994 & Supp 2000).
62 See Foley Brothers v Filardo, 336 US 281, 285 (1949) (noting that the canon
"teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
63 See Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 488 US 428, 440 (1989),
quoting Foley Brothers, 336 US at 285. William Eskridge characterizes the presumption
against extraterritoriality as "super-strong." See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statu-
tory Interpretation 328 (Harvard 1994).
64 Argentine Republic, 488 US at 440.
65 This argument is outlined in Murano, 2 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 299 (cited in note
55).
66 See 15 USC § 78j(b):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a na-
tional securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
67 15 USC § 78c(a)(17) (1994 & Supp 2000).
68 See SEC v Kasser, 548 F2d 109, 114 (3d Cir 1977) ("The securities acts expressly
apply to 'foreign commerce,' thereby evincing a Congressional intent for a broad jurisdic-
tional scope for the 1933 and 1934 Acts.").
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mere use of interstate commerce will trigger jurisdiction, regard-
less of the centrality of that medium to the resulting fraud.s9
Courts have not taken the jurisdictional implications of ei-
ther text-based argument to their logical extreme.7" The text of
the Exchange Act is ultimately ambiguous as to its extraterrito-
rial application, forcing judicial interpreters to look beyond its
language to define the statute's jurisdictional scope.
69 See Murano, 2 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 399 (cited in note 55) ("[lit is reasonable to
conclude that where fraud in extraterritorial transactions is at issue, the 1934 Act confers
subject-matter [sic] jurisdiction on the federal courts.").
70 Both text-based interpretations would sharply depart from the jurisdictional grants
all circuits have, to some degree, made.
First, courts do not apply the presumption against extraterritoriality absolutely.
See, for example, Schoenbaum v Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 206 (2d Cir 1968) (holding that
the presumption against extraterritoriality loses its strength "when extraterritorial
application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors"). Courts have, however,
found the presumption relevant when deciding which brand of conduct test to adopt. See,
for example, Robinson v TCI/ US West Cable Communications Inc, 117 F3d 900, 906 (5th
Cir 1997) ([TIhe presumption against extraterritorial application informs our choice
between the Second Circuit's restrictive test and the more expansive standards applied by
the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits."). The D.C. Circuit flirted with the idea of using the
canon to bar all suits that would require extraterritorial application of the Act, but ulti-
mately deferred to the primacy of the Second Circuit in construing the statute. See Zoelsch
v Arthur Andersen & Co, 824 F2d 27, 32 (DC Cir 1987).
The refusal to use the canonical presumption to bar these suits is likely due to the
fact that, under the jurisdictional tests, application of American securities laws is rarely
wholly extraterritorial. In the context of the modern, transnational securities markets, the
line between "domestic" and "foreign" is difficult, if not impossible, to draw. See Matson,
Note & Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 148 (cited in note 7) ("A 'domestic application' in
the transnational fraud context is unworkable I I because there is no clear line between
domestic and foreign situations. By definition, transnational securities fraud presents a
hybrid of United States and foreign activities.").
As for the broad text-based interpretation, the fact that all circuits confronting the
issue have used some form of jurisdictional test suggests that the mere use of interstate
commerce, however unrelated to the resulting fraud, will be insufficient. For example, the
Third Circuit noted that "when the actual locus of the harm is outside the territorial limits
of the United States," then the Act suggests that its application is appropriate based on its
reference to foreign commerce. Kasser, 548 F2d at 114. The court warned that there may
not be jurisdiction if the conduct was "nonexistent or was so minimal as to be immaterial"
to the resulting fraud. See id at 116.
The Second Circuit has also rejected the idea that Congress would have wanted the
Exchange Act to confer the unbounded extraterritorial jurisdiction implicated by this
textualist reading of the statute. The court found the language of § 10(b) to be "much too
inconclusive" to reflect a congressional intent "to impose rules governing conduct through-
out the world in every instance where an American company bought or sold a security."
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp v Maxwell, 468 F2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir 1972). See
also International Investment Trust v Vencap, Ltd, 519 F2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir 1975)
("[Tihe line has to be drawn somewhere if the securities laws are not to apply in every
instance where something has happened in the United States, however large the gap
between the something and a consummated fraud and however negligible the effect in the
United States or on its citizens.").
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II. THE JURISDICTIONAL TESTS: INTENTIONALISM
AND PURPOSIVISM APPLIED
Faced with insurmountable textual ambiguity, courts have
looked for decades to the supposed wishes of the enacting legisla-
ture when deciding whether to hear a securities fraud case in-
volving the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act.71 At-
tempting to perpetuate the aims of the Congress of 1934, the Sec-
ond Circuit has employed a series of jurisdictional tests: a court
may exercise jurisdiction under the effects test,72 the conduct
test,7" or a combination of the two.7 4 Other circuits have adopted
these tests as well, due in no small part to the preeminence of the
Second Circuit in the realm of securities regulation.75 Due to dis-
parate readings of legislative aims, however, application of the
conduct test varies among the circuits.
A. The Originalist Rubrics
Courts applying originalist theories of interpretation draw on
the intent or general purpose7" of the legislature that enacted the
particular statute.77 The ambiguities of original intent and pur-
pose frustrate interpretive attempts to discover them.
71 See, for example, Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 F2d 974, 985 (2d Cir 1975).
72 See Part II B.
73 See Part II C.
74 See Part II D.
75 Se& Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun
dissenting) (referring to a "justifiably esteemed" panel of the Second Circuit-a court
regarded as the "Mother Court" in the area of securities law). See also Roberta S. Karmel,
The Second Circuit's Role in Expanding the SEC'S Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 St John's L Rev
743, 743 (1991) ("In an economy which is increasingly international, New York City has
become a center of international, as well as national finance, and the Second Circuit's
securities law cases reflect this development.").
76 To say that originalist courts look to intent or purpose is somewhat misleading; a
blurred line divides the concepts, and courts interpreting the Exchange Act tend to tangle
them, further confusing the jurisdictional inquiry. See, for example, MCG Inc v Great
Western Energy Corp, 896 F2d 170, 174, 176 (5th Cir 1990) (interchanging congressional
"intent" with "purpose"). See also R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of
Statutes (1975), excerpted in William D. Popkin, ed, Materials on Legislation: Political
Language and the Political Process 219 (Foundation 2d ed 1997) (distinguishing between
the oft-confused concepts of purpose and intent by explaining that "in general legal usage
the word 'intent' coincides with the particular immediate purpose that the statute is in-
tended to directly express and immediately accomplish, whereas the word 'purpose' refers
primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute to accomplish or
help to accomplish").
77 See William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory
Interpretation, 95 Nw U L Rev 629, 632-33 (2001).
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1. Intentionalism.
An intentionalist attempts to find synergy between a particu-
lar interpretation and the aims of the legislature that crafted the
statute.78 This method of interpretation begins from the premise
that a coherent legislative intent79 is available for a persistent
interpreter to unearth. °
When faced with the issue of the extraterritorial application
of the Exchange Act, courts have traditionally relied on an inten-
tionalist inquiry." In making its jurisdictional determination, a
court is to use its "best judgment as to what Congress would have
wished if these problems [of extraterritorial application] had oc-
curred to it." 2
2. Purposivism.
A second originalist theory of statutory interpretation, pur-
posivism, attempts to apply statutes in a way that aligns with the
78 See Charles B. Nutting and Reed Dickerson, Cases and Materials on Legislation
452 (West 5th ed 1978) ("The court must decide for itself what the legislature must have
meant, or would have meant had it been confronted with the issue presented for judicial
decision."). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials
on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 628 (West 2d ed 1995).
79 See Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United States, in D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, eds, Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 407,
416 (Dartmouth 1991) (explaining that the argument from intentionalism "presupposes an
object of intention relevant to interpretation").
80 For a more acerbic characterization of the basic premise of intentionalism, see
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv J L
& Pub Pol 59, 60 (1988) ("The common uses of legislative history assume that intent mat-
ters. The judge rooting about in the history of the statute assumes, in other words, that
the written word is but an imperfect reflection of the real law.").
81 See SEC v Banner Fund International, 211 F3d 602, 608 (DC Cir 2000) ("Whether a
federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action arising under the secu-
rities laws of the United States is a question of congressional intent."); Zoelsch v Arthur
Andersen & Co, 824 F2d 27, 30 (DC Cir 1987) ("In this state of affairs, our inquiry be-
comes the dubious but apparently unavoidable task of discerning a purely hypothetical
legislative intent."); International Investment Trust v Vencap, Ltd, 519 F2d 1001, 1017 (2d
Cir 1975) ("We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a
base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are ped-
dled only to foreigners."); SEC v Kasser, 548 F2d 109, 114 (3d Cir 1977) (analyzing the
Exchange Act and finding "a Congressional intent for a broad jurisdictional scope"); Kau-
thar SDN BHD v Sternberg, 149 F3d 659, 663-64 (7th Cir 1998), cert denied, 525 US 1114
(1999) ("The courts that have addressed the issue have noted that the question is a diffi-
cult one because Congress has given little meaningful guidance on the issue. In addition,
resort to the legislative history of the securities acts does little to illuminate Congress'
intent in this area.").
82 Bersch, 519 F2d at 993.
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broader legislative impetus behind the law.83 This inquiry first
identifies the statutory objective and then determines the inter-
pretation that most accurately realizes that goal.8 4 Courts gener-
ally identify the purpose of the antifraud provisions of the Ex-
change Act as providing a remedy to manipulative securities
transactions that may threaten the interests of the investing pub-
lic.85
Courts have found the allocation of judicial resources funda-
mental to determining jurisdiction in securities fraud cases.86
Judge Friendly held that courts should decide whether Congress
would have wanted the "precious resources" of the United States
to go toward determining and enforcing the matter. While
Friendly's analysis was not explicitly purposivist,88 the Second
Circuit recently characterized it as such.89
As the analysis of the various jurisdictional tests will show,
circuits sharply disagree on the supposed intents and purposes
underlying the Exchange Act.9 This disparity suggests that in-
consistent results are a hallmark of the originalist inquiries.
B. The Effects Test
The Second Circuit created the effects test believing that
Congress enacted the Exchange Act to protect domestic investors
83 See Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 628 (cited in note 78) (characterizing the
purposivist quest as finding meaning "consistent with general reasons why the enacting
legislature believed the statute should be adopted").
84 See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 25 (cited in note 63). See also
Summers, Statutory Interpretation at 415 (cited in note 79) (noting that "[t]he ultimate
purpose of a statute may be explicit or it may be implicit from a reading of the statute as a
whole," and "[airguments that favour one choice of meaning over another because the one
better serves the ultimate purposes are 'evaluative' in an important though attenuated
sense," meaning that "they provide a basis for the comparative evaluation of alternative
readings of the statute as more or less suitable means to statutory ends").
85 See, for example, EOC, 147 F3d at 125 (discussing Second Circuit precedent and
noting that '[the antifraud provisions are designed to remedy deceptive and manipulative
conduct with the potential to harm the public interest or the interests of investors").
86 See Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 F2d 974, 985 (2d Cir 1975). See also Alfadda
v Fenn, 935 F2d 475, 478 (2d Cir 1991) (noting that courts "must" use Judge Friendly's
test for judicial resource allocation when faced with a case involving transnational fraud).
87 Bersch, 519 F2d at 985.
88 Friendly's inquiry turned on whether the original Congress would have wanted
judicial resources to be spent on a particular case, not on whether the broad "purposes" of
the Exchange Act would be met by granting jurisdiction. See id.
89 See EOC, 147 F3d at 125 (holding that "the underlying purpose" of the statutory
provision is critical to answering the question of proper resource allocation).
90 See Part II C.
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and national markets from fraudulent securities transactions.91
The central inquiry of the effects test is whether fraudulent ex-
traterritorial conduct had a substantial impact on the investors
or markets of the United States.92 The effects must be more than
"remote and indirect" to qualify as "substantial."93
In the case that gave rise to the effects test, Schoenbaum v
Firstbrook,s4 the Second Circuit first recognized the extraterrito-
rial force of the Exchange Act.95 In Schoenbaum, an American
shareholder of a Canadian corporation traded on both the Ameri-
can and Toronto Stock Exchanges alleged fraud on the part of the
defendant corporations and directors.96 Reversing the district
court's conclusion that the Exchange Act applied only within the
United States, the Second Circuit held that Congress intended
the Act to protect both domestic investors and markets from
fraudulent foreign transactions.97 While finding that the plaintiff
in the instant case had not sufficiently alleged a cause of action
under § 10(b),9" the court made it clear that the reach of the Act
could extend beyond the geographical territory of the United
States.99
In cases where both parties are foreign citizens or entities,
courts have refused to find subject matter jurisdiction under the
effects test. °0 No jurisdiction lies under the effects test without a
91 See Schoenbaum v Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 206 (2d Cir 1968), revd on other
grounds, 405 F2d 215 (2d Cir 1968) (en banc).
92 See Robinson v TCII US West Cable Communications, Inc, 117 F3d 900, 905 (5th
Cir 1997).
13 Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v Minorco, SA, 871 F2d 252, 262 (2d Cir 1989).
94 405 F2d 200 (2d Cir 1968), revd on other grounds, 405 F2d 215 (2d Cir 1968) (en
banc).
95 Id at 207.
96 Id at 204.
97 See id at 206 ("We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased
foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market
from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities.").
98 Schoenbaum, 405 F2d at 213.
99 See id at 208 ("We hold that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over
violations of the Securities Exchange Act although the transactions which are alleged to
violate the Act take place outside the United States, at least when the transactions in-
volve stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to
the interests of American investors.").
100 See EOC, 147 F3d at 128 ("[Tlhe effects test concerns the impact of overseas activ-
ity on U.S. investors and securities traded on U.S. securities exchanges."). See also Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp v Maxwell, 468 F2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir 1972):
If all the misrepresentations here alleged had occurred in England, we
would entertain most serious doubt whether [under the effects test] ...
§10(b) would be applicable simply because of the adverse effect of the
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"U.S. entity that Congress could have wished to protect from the
machinations of swindlers."'0 ' Therefore, most extraterritorial
applications of the Exchange Act find their jurisdictional basis in
the conduct test. °2
C. The Conduct Test
While the effects test considers the impact of extraterritorial
behavior on domestic entities, the conduct test focuses on actions
taking place within the United States. To find jurisdiction under
the conduct test, courts agree that the activity must somehow
"relate[ I to the alleged scheme to defraud."0 3 The circuits differ
as to the required strength of the relationship between the do-
mestic conduct and the resulting fraud.0 4
1. The narrow conduct-based tests.
The D.C. Circuit imposes the most stringent standard for
satisfying the conduct test, requiring that the conduct occurring
within the United States amount to fraud under the Act. 10 5 Zo-
elsch v Arthur Andersen & Co °6 is the archetypal example of this
approach, a case in which the D.C. Circuit refused to find juris-
diction where West German investors alleged that an American
accounting firm made fraudulent statements in an audit report
distributed to them in West Germany.' 7 Even though the inves-
tors allegedly relied on the report to their detriment, the court
fraudulently induced purchase in England of sgcurities of an English cor-
poration, not traded in an organized American securities market, upon an
American corporation whose stock is listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change and its shareholders.
'o' EOC, 147 F3d at 128. See also Vencap, 519 F2d at 1017 (rejecting jurisdiction un-
der the effects test where a British investment trust purchased foreign securities in an
allegedly fraudulent sale and only 0.2% of the fundholders were Americans).
102 See, for example, MCG, Inc v Western Energy Corp, 896 F2d 170, 174-75 (5th Cir
1990) (explaining that "[b]ecause [the stock at issue] was not registered on any American
exchange, and because no American individual or corporate entity can be said to have
invested in the London offering, the Schoenbaum 'effects' test is not applicable" and noting
that "the cases in which jurisdiction was exercised to protect innocent foreign investors
have underscored the alleged conduct of the defendants in the United States").
103 Tamari v Bache & Co (Lebanon) SAL, 730 F2d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir 1984).
104 See Kauthar SDN BHD v Sternberg, 149 F3d 649, 665 (7th Cir 1998), cert denied,
525 US 1114 (1999) ("The predominant difference among the circuits, it appears, is the
degree to which the American-based conduct must be related causally to the fraud and the
resultant harm to justify the application of American securities law.").
105 See id.
106 824 F2d 27 (DC Cir 1987).
107 See id at 28.
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refused to hear the case." 8 Adopting language used by the Second
Circuit, the court found that the alleged misrepresentations were
"merely preparatory" to and did not "directly cause" the fraud.0 9
But for its deference to the Second Circuit and a desire to
"avoid a multiplicity of jurisdictional tests," the D.C. Circuit sug-
gested that it would never find jurisdiction over a claim involving
domestic conduct that resulted in foreign loss."' In settling for its
"more restrictive test," the court concluded that the Exchange Act
reflects congressional concern with foreign transactions only
when they adversely impact the investors or markets of the
United States.'
The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits also use a narrow
conduct test, although a version slightly less stringent than that
of the D.C. Circuit. These courts assert jurisdiction when the do-
mestic conduct is substantial and directly causes the resulting
harm.'12 Courts in this camp interpret the Exchange Act to apply
"whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material im-
portance" took place in the United States."3
When the transaction is predominantly foreign, however,
these circuits will not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
sole basis of significant domestic conduct." 4 Instead, this variant
of the conduct test rests on the belief that Congress enacted the
securities laws "to protect American investors and markets, as
opposed to the victims of any fraud that somehow touches the
United States."115 Broadening subject matter jurisdiction beyond
what the statute minimally requires is, in the words of the Fifth
108 See id at 29.
109 Id at 35, quoting Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 F2d 974, 992-93 (2d Cir 1975).
110 Zoelsch, 824 F2d at 32.
111 Id. The D.C. Circuit has since held that courts have jurisdiction when a United
States resident "is allegedly defrauded in the United States in connection with the sale of
securities." SEC v Banner Fund International, 211 F3d 602, 609 (DC Cir 2000).
112 See Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 F2d 974, 993 (2d Cir 1975) (holding that the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act "[aipply to losses from sales of securities to
Americans resident abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material im-
portance in the United States have significantly contributed thereto"). See also Robinson v
TCI/ US West Cable Communications, Inc, 117 F3d 900, 906 (5th Cir 1997) (adopting the
test of the Second Circuit); Kauthar, 149 F3d at 666-67 (adopting the test of the Second
Circuit and noting that the approach "requires a higher quantum of domestic conduct than
do the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits").
113 Bersch, 519 F2d at 993.
114 See Angiolillo, The Power of Federal Courts at 480 (cited in note 29) (noting that the
Second Circuit standard "requires that the defendants' substantial acts in the United
States must have directly caused the plaintiffs' alleged losses abroad" in contrast with
"M[the more lenient version of the test, adopted by the Third, Eighth, and the Ninth Cir-
cuits, [which] requires U.S. conduct that is significant to the fraud").
115 Robinson, 117 F3d at 906.
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Circuit, "unwarranted in the absence of an express legislative
command.""' Thus the Second Circuit has found jurisdiction over
transactions predominantly foreign in nature when harm to a
domestic market or investor accompanies meetings or communi-
cations involving the United States.'17
Applying this standard, the Second Circuit has created a
"balancing test" under which the availability of jurisdiction turns
on the proportion of conduct occurring within the United States
as compared to the proportion that took place abroad."8 Accord-
ingly, "merely preparatory" activity is insufficient for extraterri-
torial application of the Act."9
Robinson v TCII US West Communications, Inc12° provides a
recent illustration of this version of the conduct test. In Robinson,
the Fifth Circuit found jurisdiction when an English minority
shareholder brought a securities claim against a controlling
group of American and predominantly British corporations.'21 The
defendants allegedly used a valuation letter sent from the United
States to induce the plaintiff to sell his stock. 2' The court found
that the instruction letter directly caused the plaintiff's loss, and
thus provided an adequate basis for jurisdiction."3
2. The broad conduct-based tests.
At the more liberal end of the spectrum, the Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits grant jurisdiction when domestic conduct
bears a "significant" relationship to the alleged fraud. 124 Addi-
116 Id.
117 See EOC, 147 F3d at 130.
118 See International Investment Trust v Cornfield, 619 F2d 909, 920-21 (2d Cir 1975)
("Determination whether American activities 'directly' caused losses to foreigners depends
not only on how much was done in the United States, but also on how much.., was done
abroad.").
119 See Bersch, 519 F2d at 987.
120 117 F3d 900 (5th Cir 1997).
121 See id at 902-03, 907.
122 See id at 904.
123 See id at 907 ("The instruction letter was more than merely preparatory-it di-
rectly triggered the injury of which [the plaintiff] now complains. This is a sufficient basis
for subject matter jurisdiction.").
124 See, for example, Continental Grain (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Oilseeds, 592 F2d
409, 420 (8th Cir 1979) ("[W]e examine the relationship between defendants' conduct in
the United States and the alleged fraudulent scheme, specifically whether defendants'
conduct in the United States was significant with respect to the alleged violation, and
whether it furthered the fraudulent scheme.") (footnotes omitted). See also SEC v Kasser,
548 F2d 109, 114 (3d Cir 1977) (noting that jurisdiction should be granted "where at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country"); Grun-
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tionally, as with the more stringent versions of the test, the con-
duct must be a direct cause of the loss, and cannot be "merely
preparatory."125 These circuits base their interpretation of the
conduct test on the notion that Congress intended the Exchange
Act to promote high standards of business conduct and deter
would-be defrauders from using the United States as a base for
their activities.
In Grunenthal GmbH v Hotz,127 the Ninth Circuit asserted
jurisdiction over a securities fraud claim involving the sale of for-
eign securities between a West German corporation and a Mexi-
can corporation controlled by Bahamian holding companies and
owned by citizens of Switzerland and Mexico.12s Although most of
the activity occurred abroad, the parties executed the fraudulent
agreement in the United States after a meeting in Los Angeles
that, according to the court, "further[ed] the fraudulent
scheme."129 While the proportion of activity that took place in the
United States might not have been adequate to satisfy a nar-
rower version of the conduct test, the Ninth Circuit found it
jurisdictionally sufficient."'
D. The Combined Conduct and Effects Test
While courts conventionally apply either the conduct or the
effects test when deciding whether to confer jurisdiction, the Sec-
ond Circuit has held that these inquiries are not mutually exclu-
sive.31 An "admixture" of the tests may better signal a domestic
interest that sufficiently justifies the assertion of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Exchange Act.132
enthal GmbH v Hotz, 712 F2d 421, 425 (9th Cir 1983) (adopting the Continental Grain
standard).
125 See Continental Grain, 592 F2d at 420, quoting International Investment Trust v
Vencap, Ltd, 519 F2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir 1975).
126 See Grunenthal, 712 F2d at 425 ('[T]he view adopted by the Third and Eighth
Circuits is consistent with the intent of Congress, as expressed in the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws, to elevate the standard of conduct in securities transactions
within this country.") (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
127 712 F2d 421 (9th Cir 1983).
128 See id at 421-22.
129 Id at 425.
130 See id at 426 ('Because defendants utilizing instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce made misrepresentations in the United States that were significant with respect to
the securities laws violations and furthered the fraudulent scheme, and because those
misrepresentations were material and not merely preparatory, jurisdiction exists over
plaintiffs cause of action.").
131 See Itoba Ltd v LEP Group PLC, 54 F3d 118, 122 (2d Cir 1995).
132 See id at 121-22 ("There is no requirement that these two tests be applied sepa-
rately and distinctly from each other. Indeed, an admixture or combination of the two
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The Second Circuit announced the efficacy of such a combina-
tion in Itoba'Ltd v LEP Group PLC.133 There, the district court
dismissed a suit brought by a Bermuda-based subsidiary of an
American corporation against a British-based issuer for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.' Holding that "a sufficient combina-
tion of ingredients" of both tests existed,'35 the Second Circuit re-
manded the case on the merits to further explore the jurisdic-
tional issues.'36
The plaintiff in Itoba was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a
Bermuda-based transnational holding company listed on the New
York Stock Exchange; approximately half of the shareholders in
the parent company were residents of the United States.'37 The
plaintiff purchased shares in a transnational holding company
based in London and traded primarily on the International Stock
Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 3 s
Central to the plaintiff's investment decision was a report that a
London investment bank created on the basis of a form that the
British holding company filed with the SEC.'39 The plaintiff al-
leged that the company failed to disclose material facts in its SEC
filing.4 ° When those facts became public, the value of the shares
depreciated considerably.' The shares in the British holding
company were issued and purchased in England,' where the
company also prepared its SEC filing.' Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit found a sufficient combination of harmful domestic effects
often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States involvement to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court.").
133 54 F3d 118 (2d Cir 1995).
134 See id at 120.
135 Id.
136 See id at 125 (noting that the defendant's "failure to disclose material, nonpublic
information prior to selling his [ ] shares is the type of behavior that falls under this Rule
10b-5 rubric," for "[b]ecause antifraud provisions are designed to prevent corporate insid-
ers from taking unfair advantage of uninformed outsiders, [the defendant's] alleged non-
disclosure during a sales transaction executed by two parties within the United States-
[the defendant] and his broker-is the type of conduct that should trigger jurisdiction")
(footnotes omitted).
137 See Itoba, 54 F3d at 120.
138 See id.
139 See id at 121. The British holding company filed Form 20-F with the SEC when
depositing shares in an American depository for trade on NASDAQ as American Deposi-
tory Shares. See id at 120.
140 See Itoba, 54 F3d at 124.
141 See id.
142 See id at 123.
143 See id at 124.
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and significant local conduct for purposes of subject matter juris-
diction.1
4 4
E. The Additional "Tipping Factors"
In 1998, the Second Circuit grafted an additional require-
ment for transient foreign investors onto its already narrow ver-
sion of the conduct test. When the parties are not American citi-
zens or entities, and the securities are not traded on a United
States exchange, the court held that there must be "some addi-
tional factor tipping the scales in favor of [American] jurisdic-
tion."145 Possible factors include "a transaction on a U.S. ex-
change, economic activity in the U.S., harm to a U.S. party, or
activity by a U.S. person or entity meriting redress."146
In EOC, the defendants allegedly defrauded a transient for-
eigner through investments made by phone calls and faxes placed
between the plaintiff's vacation home in Florida and the defen-
dants' offices in London.147 Had the investor been an American,
these communications would have satisfied even a narrow ver-
sion of the conduct test.'48 Because the foreign plaintiff could not
point to any additional conduct implicating a domestic interest,
however, the Second Circuit declined to confer jurisdiction.149
Thus far, the tipping factor requirement is unique to the Sec-
ond Circuit.5 ' Nonetheless, the court's considerable influence in
the realm of securities jurisprudence makes it likely that this ad-
ditional impediment will influence the jurisdictional decisions of
other circuits.'51 Basing EOC on the supposed wishes of the enact-
ing Congress, the Second Circuit has succeeded in compounding
the uncertainty associated with the conduct tests. The tipping
factor requirement underscores the problems associated with bas-
"I See Itoba, 54 F3d at 124.
145 EOC, 147 F3d at 129-30.
146 Id at 130.
147 There was a dispute as to whether the first transaction occurred exclusively in
London, but the court notes that at least six orders were placed from Florida. See 147 F3d
at 121-22.
148 See id at 129-30.
149 See id.
150 The only courts to have mentioned the tipping factors since EOC have been district
courts within the Second Circuit. See, for example, In re Gaming Lottery Securities Litiga-
tion, 58 F Supp 2d 62, 74 (S D NY 1999) (finding that tipping factors may now "some-
times" be required); Interbrew SA v Edperbrascan Corp, 23 F Supp 2d 425, 432 (S D NY
1998).
151 As noted earlier, the Second Circuit is preeminent in the area of securities law. See
Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun dissenting).
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ing jurisdictional decisions on shaky divinations of congressional
intent and purpose.
III. CHANGING THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK:
DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN THE ABSTRACT
If the intentions and purposes underlying the Exchange Act
were readily available to interpreters, those concepts would ap-
propriately be central to the judicial query surrounding the stat-
ute's extraterritorial reach. Unfortunately, originalist methods
cannot contend with an Act that is silent on its extraterritorial
application in a global marketplace. Considering policy factors in
addition to text and history enables courts to pay due deference to
statutory context while acknowledging the current state of the
economic world.'52 A dynamic reading of the antifraud provisions
of the Exchange Act will not lead to the abandonment of the ju-
risdictional tests courts have developed under originalist inquir-
ies. Rather, it will force courts to reconsider the narrow applica-
tion of the conduct test that many have implemented.'53
A. The Indeterminacy of Origininalist Methods
By pursuing the original intent and purpose of the enacting
Congress, courts produce arbitrarily indeterminate conclusions of
the aims of the Exchange Act.' Problematically, "none of the
originalist schools ... is able to generate a theory of what the
process or coalition 'would want' over time, after circumstances
have changed."'55 Judge Friendly himself recognized that "[t]he
Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in
the midst of the depression could hardly have been expected to
foresee the development" of an economy so complicated with in-
ternational transactions.'56 Rather than relying on vague concep-
tions of intent or purpose, courts should openly recognize and
adopt an interpretive method that allows them to react to the
economic transformations that have taken place since 1934.
152 See Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 629 (cited in note 78).
153 For a discussion of the narrow versions of the conduct test, see Part II C 1.
154 See Matson, Note & Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 148 (cited in note 7) ('The
circuit courts have engaged in concededly arbitrary linedrawing to extend the jurisdic-
tional boundaries of the antifraud provisions to cover transnational fraud."). See also Part
II C.
155 Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 14 (cited in note 63).
156 Bersch v Drexel Firestone Inc, 519 F2d 974, 993 (2d Cir 1975).
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1. The ambiguity of original legislative motive.
It is impossible to determine with any kind of objective accu-
racy how the Congress of 1934 might have responded to the mod-
ern global economy. 57 As a theoretical matter, it may be appeal-
ing for a court to interpret a statute by hypothetically acquaint-
ing the Congress of 1934 with the internationalized economy,
asking that body how it would like the Exchange Act to apply,
and then documenting the answer in a judicial opinion. Practi-
cally, it is impossible to record such an exchange with secretarial
objectivity.'58 Due to the unavoidable infiltration of policy consid-
erations, judicial determinations of congressional intent cannot
be impartial transcriptions.'59
The disparate judicial inquiries surrounding the extraterrito-
rial application of the Exchange Act highlight the tendency to-
ward authorial and interpretive disharmony. The pursuit of
original intent and purpose has led to competing views of the
157 Although Judge Easterbrook argues that text rather than evolutive policy factors
should be determinative in statutory interpretation, his discussion of the originalist in-
quiry is useful in highlighting its flaws as a method purporting to produce objective re-
sults:
This method incorporates a principle of original intent-intent of the sub-
jective variety. Its fundamental assumption is that whatever Congress
thinks, is law. The role of the judge is to figure out the mental pattern of
the legislature. This usually appears through the words of the stat-
ute .... [and] [wihen the words leave doubt, we turn to the legislative
history .... [tihe import of the statutory language may be left behind,
may be replaced by this subjective vision .... Original intent controls, if
only we can find it.
Easterbrook, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 60 (cited in note 80).
158 Zechariah Chafee has highlighted the problem arising when a reader probes a
written document to extract the aim of its original author. See The Disorderly Conduct of
Words, 41 Colum L Rev 383, 398 (1941) (asking "what part does the user's intention play
in the determination of the legal effect of words?"). Chafee maintains that "legal interpre-
tation is a passing from the word to the object through somebody's mind"-not the mind of
the author, but the mind of the judge. Id at 399. While the judge "may be influenced by
what he believes the [author] ... to have thought, the mental operations of the two men
cannot fully correspond." Id.
159 See William N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Prac-
tical Reasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321, 330 (1990):
Facts about the past are without meaning until they are woven together
into a narrative by the historian (or judge) .... And in choosing and in-
terpreting facts, even the most scrupulous historian will be influenced by
her own biases, meta-theories, and desired conclusions .... And the
greater the distance between the current and historical contexts of the
statute the more implausible will be the claims of intentionalist interpre-
tation.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
aims and intentions underlying the statute."' 0 That the same con-
gressional intent or purpose could lead to such incongruous ex-
tensions of jurisdiction suggests that these concepts are neither
readily discoverable nor uniformly understood. 161
Ultimately, "[o]ther important factors beside the supposed
intention of the [author] ... contribute to the thought which the
judge ultimately frames before applying the words to the outside
world."16 2 A method of interpretation that openly acknowledges
and considers such factors is preferable to one that professes to
ignore the part they play in the ultimate determination. 163 Judges
should forgo the rituals of originalism and instead interpret the
Exchange Act in a way that permits explicit discussion of the pol-
icy factors relevant to a jurisdictional decision.
2. Judicial dissatisfaction with originalism.
Some circuits blatantly acknowledge the significance of policy
considerations to the jurisdictional inquiry, refusing to stay
within the confines of the originalist analyses courts traditionally
employ in this context. In holding that the securities laws should
apply to a conduct-based claim centering on the use of telephones
and the mail, the Eighth Circuit "frankly admit[ted]" that its ju-
risdictional grant was "largely a policy decision."1 64 Similarly, the
Third Circuit grounded its broad jurisdictional grant on the idea
that the case "call[ed] for a policy decision."165
The circuits that apply narrow versions of the conduct test
have rejected the move to include policy considerations in their
analyses. 6' The D.C. Circuit has stated that the expansive view
160 See Kauthar SDN BHD v Sternberg, 149 F3d 649, 665 (7th Cir 1998), cert denied,
525 US 1114 (1999) ("Although the circuits that have confronted the matter seem to agree
that there are some transnational situations to which the antifraud provisions of the secu-
rities laws are applicable, agreement appears to end at that point.") (footnote omitted).
161 See Chafee, 41 Colum L Rev at 398-99 (cited in note 158) ("[Fhat the judge would
have intended in the circumstances of the writer or what a reasonable man would have
intended or what the normal speaker of English would have intended may also be helpful,
but they have even less to do with the mind of the man who used the words.").
162 Id at 399.
163 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev 20,
31 (1988) ("All interpretive theories must ultimately be grounded in a political theory and
a theory of law, even if the interpreter is unwilling to recognize or state the underlying
premises.").
164 See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Oilseeds, Inc, 592 F2d 409, 421
(8th Cir 1979).
165 SEC v Kasser, 548 F2d 109, 116 (3d Cir 1977).
166 See Zoelsch, 824 F2d at 32-33 (noting that it was "not persuaded by the reasoning
of those circuits that have broadened federal court jurisdiction for reasons that are essen-
tially legislative," for "Congress is available to make any policy decisions that are re-
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of subject matter jurisdiction "may provide very good reasons why
Congress should amend the statute but are less adequate as rea-
sons why courts should do so. "16'
Significantly, the D.C. Circuit's condemnation of those cir-
cuits that consider policy factors was not unanimous. The Chief
Judge, while concurring in the judgment, noted that the text and
legislative history of the Exchange Act "provide little guidance"
on the issue of its extraterritorial application.16 The Chief Judge
went on to maintain that "[t]he decisions cited by the majority as
examples of judicial lawmaking clearly indicate that the policies
adopted are those the court perceives as most consistent with the
intent of Congress in enacting federal securities laws."169 Al-
though originalist inquiries do not formally allow for considera-
tions of policy,17 ° judicial citation of such considerations indicates
their analytical pervasiveness.
B. Dynamic Interpretation Mitigates the
Inadequacies of Text and History
As cases decided under originalist frameworks suggest, some
degree of subjectivity inheres in the extraterritorial inquiry."1
The dynamic model attempts to respond to the fact that policy
considerations invariably bleed into originalist methods, advanc-
ing a more pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation.
17 2
quired"); Robinson, 117 F3d at 906 (rejecting the broad conduct test in favor of the narrow
version proffered by the Second Circuit on the grounds that Congress crafted the securi-
ties laws to protect domestic markets and investors, making it improper to extend their
jurisdictional reach absent legislative mandate).
167 Zoelsch, 824 F2d at 33.
168 Id at 36 (Wald concurring).
169 Id at 37 (Wald concurring).
170 See Part II A.
171 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U Pa L Rev 687,
702 (1998) ("Some degree of indeterminacy is thus inherent in all legal standards, however
carefully defined, and certain essential equitable values of their nature are not susceptible
to precise articulation in any event."); Summers, Statutory Interpretation at 415-16 (cited
in note 79) (noting that while the argument from legislative intention can be objective,
'[miost often it purports to be subjective," and purposivism is similarly imprecise, as "[t]he
ultimate purpose may not be clear, or may rest on dubious evidence"). See also Matson,
Note & Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 160 (cited in note 7) (noting that, under the cur-
rent interpretive methodology, "[c]ourts set forth an elastic test and then determine juris-
diction based on the inarticulable philosophies or predilections of the presiding judges").
172 See Van Alstine, 146 U Pa L Rev at 713 (cited in note 171) ("Continuing realist
skepticism about the capacity of any one interpretive theory to produce determinate re-
sults, either descriptively or normatively, has given rise in recent years to a more prag-
matic approach to statutory interpretation.").
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1. An outline of the dynamic model.
As forwarded by William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, dy-
namic interpretation recognizes that "statutory interpretation
involves creative policymaking by judges and is not just the
Court's figuring out the answer that was put 'in' the statute by
the enacting legislature."'73 The fact that an interpreter works
within a social context, not a vacuum, unavoidably influences the
statutory analysis.'74 While the text, legislative history, and cir-
cumstances of a particular case all confine the scope of a judicial
decision, statutory interpretation is not devoid of all considera-
tions of policy. 7'
Dynamic interpretation recognizes that legislative interpre-
tation is a creative process involving not only text, but also his-
torical and evolutive considerations.'76 Statutory language that
does not clearly mandate a particular application forces a court to
consider other sources.'77 "When successive applications of the
statute occur in contexts not anticipated by its authors," the dy-
namic model acknowledges that "the statute's meaning evolves
beyond original expectations."'78 The approach of the interpreter
changes along with underlying societal assumptions.'79
173 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 345 (cited in note 159).
174 See id at 347 ("Hermeneutics suggests that as the interpreter's own background
context-her 'tradition'--changes, so too will her interpretive choice.").
175 See id ("Although the interpreter's range of choices is somewhat constrained by the
text, the statute's history, and the circumstances of its application, the actual choice will
not be 'objectively' determinable; interpretation will often depend upon political and other
assumptions held by judges.").
176 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev
1479, 1498 (1987). See also id at 1483 (noting that "statutory interpretation involves the
present-day interpreter's understanding and reconciliation of three different perspectives,
no one of which will always control," perspectives of statutory text; "the original legislative
expectations surrounding the statute's creation"; and "the subsequent evolution of the
statute and its present context"); Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 352 (cited in
note 159) (describing the dynamic process and noting that the "model holds that an inter-
preter will look at a broad range of evidence-text, historical evidence, and the text's evo-
lution-and thus form a preliminary view of the statute").
17' Even textualists concede this point. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 68 (1994) ("Let us not
pretend that texts answer every question. Instead we must admit that there are gaps in
statutes, as in the law in general."). See also Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 30 (cited in note
163) (noting that Justice Scalia "recognizes that much statutory language cannot fairly be
characterized as clear," and when it cannot be, "he will search for other sources of mean-
ing").
178 Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 49 (cited in note 63).
179 See id at 53. See also Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw U L Rev 1409, 1415 (2000) ("At the most abstract level,
Eskridge argues that all interpretation necessarily involves an effort to align the world of
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Under the dynamic theory, the statutory text controls when
it is both recent and directly relevant to the interpretive issue.' °
When the text is inconclusive and societal changes have over-
taken the expectations of the enacting legislature, however, the
dynamic model encourages the consideration of evolutive policy
factors. 8' Rather than purporting to ignore them, a dynamic in-
terpreter may openly give relevant policy factors a role in the
analysis.'82
In the jurisdictional inquiry surrounding extraterritorial se-
curities fraud claims, the text, historical backdrop, and subse-
quent economic changes point to the value of dynamic interpreta-
tion. Both the language of the Exchange Act and the legislative
history of its antifraud provisions prove inconclusive as to their
extraterritorial application.'83 Judge Friendly "freely acknowl-
edge[d]" that if asked "to point to language in the statutes, or
even in the legislative history, that compelled [the jurisdictional
grant], [h]e would be unable to respond."'84 The absence of clear
guidance in the text or legislative history of the Exchange Act
underscores the use of an interpretive model that candidly looks
to policy considerations when making a jurisdictional determina-
tion.
the reader with that of the author, making static interpretation impossible.") (footnotes
omitted).
180 See Eskridge, 135 U Pa L Rev at 1496 (cited in note 176) ("[We should trust our
reading of the text primarily when the statute is recent and the context of the enactment
represents considered legislative deliberation and decision on the interpretive issue.").
181 See id at 1484. See also Blatt, 95 Nw U L Rev at 639 (cited in note 77) (noting that,
for those who view the legislative process as a forum for deliberation-a theory which
supports dynamic interpretation--"[]egislation is part of an ongoing debate over public
values," and maintaining that "[c]ourts participate in this ongoing discussion and are not
limited to materials emanating from the legislative process") (footnote omitted).
182 See Blatt, 95 Nw U L Rev at 633 (cited in note 77) ("Dynamic interpreters, notably
Profesors Eskridge, Sunstein, and Aleinikoff, broaden the inquiry by considering the best
answer, the result a court would reach if unconstrained by original intentions."). See also
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539, 1584 n 242 (1988)
(citing Eskridge for the assertion that "[clourts have also employed clear statement prin-
ciples of statutory construction so as to help bring about consistency and coordination in
the law" and noting Eskridge's argument that "courts should interpret statutes so as to
allow for changing social conditions"); Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 62-63 (cited in note
163) (discussing a "nautical model" of statutory interpretation, a model that "sees inter-
preters as supplying important direction to the development of law in a complex, changing
society" where "[tiogether, drafters and interpreters create a legal system").
183 See Parts I D and III A.
184 Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 F2d 974, 993 (2d Cir 1975).
468 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2001:
2. Dynamic interpretation does not undermine
majoritarian principles.
Even conceding that evolutive factors are useful in escaping
the jurisdictional quagmire, critics argue that, under the Consti-
tution, it falls to the legislature to make such policy determina-
tions. 85 Congress is not only capable of amending a statute to
answer jurisdictional uncertainty, but democratic principles
grant the legislature the exclusive province to do so. 8 ' A court
should not usurp the function of Congress by injecting policy con-
siderations into its interpretation of a statute.'87
The response to the concern regarding the democratic legiti-
macy of dynamic interpretation is threefold. First, policy consid-
erations arise under any interpretive model. "Legislative su-
premacy does not require the Court to ignore evolutive considera-
tions in its decisions,"188 and arguing the possibility of doing so
ignores the inevitable presence of context in statutory interpreta-
tion. Judicial efforts to the contrary, "current values cannot easily
be excluded from statutory interpretation."'89 Policy considera-
tions often wield unavoidable influence when decisions follow re-
cent statutory pronouncements. 9 ° This suggests that the influ-
ence of such considerations is even stronger when a court at-
tempts to apply a statute enacted sixty-seven years ago.' 9'
185 See Farber, 94 Nw U L Rev at 1416 (cited in note 179) ("The textualist response to
all this is predictable but powerful: it is up to the legislature and the executive to make
policy judgments and adapt legal rules to changing times. It is up to unelected judges to
follow the rules laid down for them.").
186 For a more general discussion of this argument, see Easterbrook, 17 Harv J L &
Pub Pol at 66 (cited in note 177):
Any theory of meaning must be jurisprudential. What does the Constitu-
tion require legislatures to do to produce a law? What is the proper rela-
tion between tenured judges and evolving legislatures? To the extent the
constitutional rules permit this inquiry, what are the relative costs of er-
ror from expansive versus beady-eyed readings? These are the right ques-
tions, and I believe the answer lies in a relatively unimaginative, me-
chanical process of interpretation.
187 See id at 64 (advocating the textualist approach as "sticking to lower levels of gen-
erality, preferring the language and structure of the law whenever possible over its legis-
lative history and imputed values"). See also id at 63 (noting that society wants the legal
system to "empower Congress," and so courts should "let [Congress] make rules" by 'using
whatever approach Congress picks, adhering rather than shifting").
18 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 381 (cited in note 159).
189 Id at 341.
190 See id ("Where current values and historical context strongly support an interpre-
tation, a determinate text will not stand in the way.").
191 See Part III B.
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Second, originalist and textualist methods themselves enjoy
a tenuous link to "majoritarian political preferences."'92 While
judges may rely on statutory text or legislative intent to avoid
claims of thwarting the will of the majority,193 such foundations
are hardly invulnerable. 9 4 Regarding originalism, it is misleading
to speak of a single legislative intent or purpose when potentially
innumerable intents and purposes contribute to the enactment of
a statute.1 9 In the same way, when statutory text does not offer a
"reasonably determinate source of meaning, "196 a court must go
beyond the legislative pronouncement to determine the outcome
of the case at hand.
Third, the fact that indeterminacy often accompanies
originalist theories of interpretation suggests that these methods
will not always lead courts to objective results.1 97 Courts have al-
ready demonstrated the impossibility of unearthing a legislative
intent or purpose regarding the extraterritorial application of the
Exchange Act.19 Statutory text, the first resort of the interpreter,
is similarly inconclusive in this context.'99 Despite judicial at-
192 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 380 (cited in note 159) ("[The link
between foundationalist theories of interpretation and majoritarian political preference is
tenuous, because the assumptions linking each method to majoritarianism are question-
able.").
193 For purposes of this analysis, the "majoritarian will" in question is that of the popu-
lace that elected the Congress that passed the Exchange Act in 1934.
194 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 378 (cited in note 159):
This "counter-majoritarian anxiety" arises from the view that statutory
law derives its legitimacy from its enactment by Congress, which is
elected by and accountable to the people. Hence, when the Court inter-
prets statutes, it must somehow link its interpretation with the expecta-
tions of the democratically-elected body. The Court does this by relying
upon "objective" evidence that ties its interpretation to the text of the
statute, the original expectations of Congress, or both.
195 See id at 329 (discussing the oversimplification of the idea of a legislative "intent":
"Whatever inferences one draws about the intent of the House must somehow be matched
to the intent of the Senate"). See also id at 335 (noting a similar problem with discussion
of a legislative purpose: even if it were possible to aggregate all of the interest groups that
contribute to the enactment of a particular statute, "supporters of legislation will usually
appeal to more than one public purpose in order to maximize political support").
196 See id at 341.
197 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 379 (cited in note 159) ("[Tlhe in-
determinacy of each of these theories in the hard cases suggests that none of the theories
can by itself 'objectively' predict what a reasonable Court will do. And the indeterminacy
of each theory subverts its claim to constrain the Court.").
198 See Part III A 1.
199 See Part I D.
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tempts to objectively legitimate the interpretive process, 2°° impre-
cision pervades interpretive analysis.
All sides must concede that statutory text is not always an
adequate basis for legislative interpretation. In such circum-
stances, interpreters may prefer to consult "other sources of
rules,"'' congressional intent,0 2 or policy factors.03 Disagreement
centers on the sources courts should use when text is unclear, not
whether judges will ever need to venture beyond the words of a
statute.
IV. REINTERPRETING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
UNDER THE EXCHANGE ACT:
DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION APPLIED
When interpreting the Exchange Act, some courts performing
originalist analyses have recognized that policy concerns underly-
ing the statute require adoption of the broad version of conduct
test.24 Dynamic interpretation legitimates this approach as one
that best acknowledges both the concerns of the enacting Con-
gress and the ways in which the economic climate has changed
since 1934. The analysis applies the three elements of dynamic
interpretation-text, history, and policy considerations-to the
question of the Exchange Act's jurisdictional scope.
A. The Textual Perspective
As already established, the text of the Exchange Act does not
definitively answer the question of its extraterritorial scope.0 5 In
the framework of dynamic interpretation, when statutory lan-
200 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 378 (cited in note 159) ("[Tlhe [Su-
preme] Court sometimes makes quite a show of preventing its 'subjective' preferences
from influencing statutory interpretation.").
201 See Easterbrook, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 68 (cited in note 177) ("When the text
has no answer, a court should not put one there on the basis of legislative reports or moral
philosophy--or economics! Instead the interpreter should go to some other source of rules,
including administrative agencies, common law, and private decision.").
202 See Part II A.
203 See Part III B.
204 See, for example, SEC v Kasser, 548 F2d 109, 114 (3d Cir 1977) (noting that "[flrom
a policy perspective, and it should be recognized that this case in a large measure calls for
a policy decision, we believe that there are sound rationales for asserting jurisdiction"
broadly); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Oilseeds, 592 F2d 409, 420 (8th
Cir 1979) (finding jurisdiction under a broad conduct test and conceding the large role that
policy played in that determination); Grunenthal GmbH v Hotz, 712 F2d 421, 425 (9th Cir
1983) (adopting the broad conduct test of the Third and Eighth Circuits on the ground
that it "advances the policies underlying federal securities laws"). See also Part II C 2.
205 See Part I D.
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guage is ambiguous, the words of the Act alone cannot guide its
interpretation.2 6
B. The Historical Perspective
Although the enacting Congress left few clues as to whether
the Exchange Act should apply extraterritorially, 2°7 the congres-
sional record contains multiple references to the need for a legis-
lative response to the growth and change of the economy.28 The
House Committee's report reflects a recognition that the existing
system could not adequately respond to the needs of a changing
economic landscape.0 9 Given this, it is anomalous for a court to
interpret the Act without considering the effect its decision will
have in a global economy.
C. The Evolutionary Perspective
Contemporary societal conditions and policies are critical to
statutory interpretation when, as in this instance, both the text
and legislative history are inconclusive.210 When deciding whether
to assert subject matter jurisdiction over a primarily foreign se-
curities transaction, courts have acknowledged three central pol-
icy considerations: (1) the desire to avoid turning the United
206 See Eskridge, 135 U Pa L Rev at 1483 (cited in note 176) ("When the statutory text
clearly answers the interpretive question ... it normally will be the most important con-
sideration.").
207 The legislative history surrounding the Act reflects general congressional concern
with the state of the domestic economy. See Part I A.
208 In its report accompanying the Bill, the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce determined that the "significant growth in size and importance of the
exchanges and the business they do with the public has necessitated a real difference in
kind in the treatment of that public by the law and by business ethics." Report of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, HR Rep No 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 2,
in 78 Cong Rec H 7703 (Apr 30, 1934). Discussing its prohibition of securities fraud, the
Committee stated that "[t]o insure to the multitude of investors the maintenance of fair
and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds on national exchanges are
banned." Id at 7704. See also Part I A.
209 See Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, HR Rep No
1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 2, in 78 Cong Rec H 7702 (Apr 30, 1934) (noting the need for
changes in the way the market is regulated to keep pace with market conditions and avoid
market failure).
210 See Eskridge, 135 U Pa L Rev at 1484 (cited in note 176) ("The dynamic model,
however, views the evolutive perspective as most important when the statutory text is not
clear and the original legislative expectations have been overtaken by subsequent changes
in society and law."). See also Farber, 94 Nw U L Rev at 1415-16 (cited in note 179) (not-
ing the warning of William Eskridge that "[i]ntolerable anomalies would develop without
some way to keep [statutory] provisions in tune with the changing times").
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States into a haven for defrauders;211 (2) international reciproc-
ity;212 and (3) encouraging a high standard of conduct in securities
transactions.213 Those circuits that narrowly apply the conduct
test ignore the policy-based ramifications of their jurisdictional
stinginess. Hazy determinations of congressional motive should
not preclude considerations of policy.
1. Preventing the creation of a haven for defrauders.
One relevant policy consideration courts should consider in
this context is discouraging would-be defrauders from establish-
ing operations in the United States. This rationale grows out of a
concern that denying jurisdiction through a strict conduct test
would embolden potential defrauders, encouraging them to en-
gage in illegal operations from the United States.214 Courts have
been "reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the
United States to become a 'Barbary Coast,'... harboring interna-
tional securities 'pirates.' 2 5
Under the narrow applications of the conduct test, defrauders
could use the United States in the course of their operations as
long as they did not implicate the effects test.216 Rather than de-
terring would-be defrauders from conducting their activities in
211 See SEC v Kasser, 548 F2d 109, 116 (3d Cir 1977) ("[To deny such jurisdiction may
embolden those who wish to defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers to use the
United States as a base of operations.").
212 See id ("By finding jurisdiction here, we may encourage other nations to take ap-
propriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate frauds in the United States.
Accordingly, our inclination towards finding jurisdiction is bolstered by the prospect of
reciprocal action against fraudulent schemes aimed at the United States from foreign
sources.").
213 See id ("[Tihe antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were designed to
insure high standards of conduct in securities transactions within this country in addition
to protecting domestic markets and investors from the effects of fraud. By reviving the
complaint in this case, this Court will enhance the ability of the SEC to police vigorously
the conduct of securities dealings within the United States."). See also Grunenthal, 712
F2d at 425 ("Assertion of jurisdiction may encourage Americans-such as lawyers, ac-
countants, and underwriters-involved in transnational securities sales to behave respon-
sibly and thus may prevent the development of relaxed standards that could spill over into
work on American securities transactions.") (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
214 See Kasser, 548 F2d at 116.
215 Id (internal quotations and footnote omitted). See also Kauthar SDN BHD v Stern-
berg, 149 F3d 659, 666 (7th Cir 1998) ("[We would do serious violence to the policies of
[the antifraud] statutes if we did not recognize our Country's manifest interest in ensuring
that the United States is not used as a base of operations from which to defraud foreign
securities purchasers or sellers.") (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
216 This is at least the implication of EOC, which suggests that the court will only find
jurisdiction under the conduct test in cases involving a transaction on a domestic ex-
change, domestic economic activity, or harm to a domestic party. See 147 F3d at 130.
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the United States, these courts are only demonstrating how to
avoid the sting of American securities laws.
After EOC, for example, a foreign party who conducts fraudu-
lent securities transactions over domestic telephone lines may
escape the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.217 In EOC,
the activity conducted within the United States directly caused
the harm to a foreign investor.218 The court conceded that the
activity would have provided a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
had it involved an American citizen or market.219 Under the EOC
rationale, then, as long as a foreign defrauder does not activate a
tipping factor, it can completely evade American securities
laws.
220
To be sure, the United States does not want to become a ha-
ven for the world's securities plaintiffs any more than for its de-
frauders. The broader conduct test guards against this outcome
by requiring that "at least some" fraudulent activity take place
within the United States.221 Plaintiffs will not be able to satisfy
the requirements of the conduct test unless some illegal activity
occurred in the United States. This expansive view of jurisdiction
makes the host of such activity appropriately inhospitable, a pol-
icy that the narrow conduct tests essentially ignore.
217 Although EOC is the chosen example, the narrow conduct tests that do not require
tipping factors also undermine a policy that seeks to guard against the creation of safe-
zones for defrauders. The D.C. Circuit, for example, would not find jurisdiction unless
domestic activity amounted to a fraud. See Zoelsch, 824 F2d at 33. A would-be defrauder
could carry out most of the acts material to the fraud in this country, commit the final act
elsewhere, and then escape the securities laws of the United States.
218 See EOC, 147 F3d at 129.
219 See id at 129-30:
Although phone calls (or any other communications into the United
States) soliciting or conveying an offer to sell securities ordinarily would
be sufficient to support jurisdiction, it would be inconsistent with the law
of this circuit to accept jurisdiction over this dispute, because the sur-
rounding circumstances show that no relevant interest of the United
States was implicated.
220 Those circuits applying the narrow version of the conduct test may argue that the
Second Circuit should take no action if nothing in the case would implicate a United
States interest. This argument, however, ignores the point of this policy objective: the
United States has an interest in deterring would-be defrauders from conducting their
activities within its borders. The point of contention is over the definition of "interest"; this
policy consideration understands it broadly.
221 See Kasser, 548 F2d at 114.
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2. Encouraging international reciprocity.
A second policy concern pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry
is that limiting jurisdiction over these disputes may induce other
nations to jealously guard their securities laws when their appli-
cation would serve the interests of the United States.222 The Third
Circuit has pointed out that there may be situations in which
other countries would not act when individuals are planning
fraudulent activities that they intend to perpetuate in the United
States. 3 Such a scenario would "enable defrauders beyond the
reach of our courts to escape with impunity."224
The regulatory-related aftermath of the September 11 terror-
ist attacks has underscored the need for international cooperation
in cross-border transactions. The SEC is currently leading the
investigation into the unusually high number of put options pur-
chased in airline, insurance, and brokerage stocks in the days
before the attacks. 5 In the course of its investigation, the SEC is
relying on cooperation from regulators of other national mar-
kets.22' The magnitude of the terrorist attacks makes it highly
improbable that the assertion of jurisdiction over any terrorist-
related transactions would turn on a federal court's construction
222 See id at 116.
223 See id.
224 Id.
225 See U.S. Securities and Insurance Industries: Keeping the Promise, Hearing of the
House Financial Services Committee, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 26, 2001) (statement of
SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt) (noting the "detailed, investigative techniques" required to
trace those who purchased puts on airline stock before the terrorist attacks, and postulat-
ing that 'with enough time and enough resources, [the SEC] could track down the pur-
chasers 'of these securities"). See also Ann R. Weiler and Sara D. White, For the Record,
Crain's Chi Bus 74 (Sept 24, 2001) (noting the investigation by federal regulators into "the
unusually high volume of put options on stocks involving airline companies and insurers
in the days before the attacks); Chris Blackhurst, Attack on Afghanistan: The Mystery of
Terror "Insider Dealers", Markets Windfall, Independent on Sunday (London) 8 (Oct 14,
2001) (stating that "investigators now wonder whether there is a more sinister explana-
tion" for the fact that "[sihare speculators have failed to collect $2.5m [ in profits made
from the fall in the share price of United Airlines after the 11 September World Trade
Centre attacks" and noting the unusual number of put options also purchased in shares of
brokerage firms resident in the World Trade Center).
226 See Linda Leatherdale, Uncertainty Rules, Toronto Sun 42 (Sept 19, 2001) ("Regu-
lators in the U.S., Germany and Japan are now sifting through trading records to pinpoint
any unusual trades."); Michael Schroeder, SEC Asks Canada to Assist in its Probe of Ille-
gaI Profiteering from the Attacks, Wall St J C14 (Oct 4, 2001); Paul Blustein, New Task
Forces Target Terrorist Funding; Money Laundering Studied; Groups May Have Tried to
Profit from Attacks, Wash Post A6 (Sept 20, 2001) ("A European regulatory source said
officials from 12 countries held a conference call Monday about high volumes of transac-
tions in early September of stocks and options of companies that included Munich Re
Group, a reinsurance firm, and AMR Corp., the parent of American Airlines.").
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of the conduct test. Regardless, the cross-border nature of the in-
vestigation, as well as the centrality of international cooperation
to its successful continuation, both point to the significance of this
policy consideration. A broad jurisdictional view becomes critical
to encouraging international reciprocity, which may in turn pro-
mote domestic interests.
Conversely, one could argue that haphazardly extending the
reach of American securities laws could prove a potent irritant to
other countries.227 An expansive jurisdictional policy may only
encourage jurisprudential imperialism on the part of the United
States.22 Since the 1970s, the international community has re-
sponded with "furor" to expansive United States jurisdiction.229
Under this view, evolutive policy considerations should discour-
age, not promote, expansive jurisdiction.
This counterargument fails to acknowledge the fact that, to
satisfy any jurisdictional conduct test, some nexus must exist be-
tween the activity and the United States.23 ° The broad version of
the conduct test permits jurisdiction only when conduct signifi-
cant to the fraud takes place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.231 As a general matter, Judge Friendly has
recognized that intra-territorial conduct stands as a permissible
basis for jurisdiction in this context.2"2 The United States does not
offend notions of comity by adjudicating a matter in which it has
a pronounced interest.233
227 See Gary E. Davidson, Congressional Extraterritorial Investigative Powers: Real or
Illusory?, 8 Emory Intl L Rev 99, 103 (Spring 1994) (noting the "recognition of the some-
times delicate and sensitive nature of international relations that might forestall expan-
sive congressional attempts to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction"). See also Keenan Willi-
son, Note, 33 Vand J Transnatl L at 471-72 (cited in note 9).
228 See Keenan Willison, Note, 33 Vand J Transnatl L at 471-72 (cited in note 9).
229 See Warren Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commercial and
Antitrust Legislation: A View from "Down Under," 16 Vand J Transnatl L 833, 835-36
(1983) ("The United States' perspective [regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction] was ac-
corded a somewhat uneasy acceptance until the early 1970s. By the mid-1970s, however,
this acceptance evaporated.").
230 See, for example, Continental Grain (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Oilseeds, Inc, 592
F2d 409, 420 (8th Cir 1979) (finding jurisdiction appropriate where material conduct
within the United States furthers a fraudulent scheme).
231 See Part II C 2.
232 See Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp v Maxwell, 468 F2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir
1972) ("Conduct within the territory alone would seem sufficient from the standpoint of
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule.").
233 The D.C. Circuit itself recognizes this point. See SEC v Banner Fund International,
211 F3d 602, 613 (DC Cir 2000) ("[Clonduct by a litigant designed to frustrate a signifi-
cant policy of the United States is not a ground for abstention on the basis of comity.").
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Additionally, comity concerns in fraud cases are not as poten-
tially destructive as some commentators suggest 4.2 " The economic
regulations of the United States in some areas differ markedly
from those of other countries.235 The underlying policies prohibit-
ing fraud are, however, similar enough among nations that the
exercise of jurisdiction is not as potentially offensive here as in
other contexts, such as antitrust regulation.236
As the interconnectedness of the financial markets increases,
so does the importance of stopping fraud before it results in
significant damage or, more problematically, moves beyond the
reach of judicial redress.3 7 The heightened interconnectedness of
the economic markets has complicated the enforcement of securi-
ties laws, and "Iblarriers based on rigid concepts of jurisdiction
and law enforcement are not effective in meeting this chal-
lenge."236 Commentators advocating that the United States re-
strict its extraterritorial jurisdiction in securities cases 29 overlook
the fact that, in a global marketplace, exercising jurisdiction to
punish and deter fraud benefits the greater economic community.
234 See, for example, Karmel, 65 St John's L Rev at 743 (cited in note 75) ("The greater
potential for conflict between U.S. securities laws and foreign securities laws requires a
greater concern for comity in decision making."); Hamilton, 13 St John's J Legal Commen
at 349 (cited in note 47) (advocating "restrictions on the broad reach of United States
securities laws in the interest of both fairness and international comity").
235 See, for example, Steinberg, International Securities Law at 35 (cited in note 1)
("[I]t has become increasingly clear to foreign issuers that United States disclosure re-
quirements are more onerous than the requirements of their home countries.").
236 See Michael D. Mann and Joseph G. Mari, Current Issues in International Securi-
ties Enforcement, in ALI-ABA Course of Study: Internationalization of the Securities Mar-
kets: Business Trends and Regulatory Policy 101, 134 (ALI 1988):
Decisions about subject matter jurisdiction under the U.S. securities laws
have not been particularly controversial, since the policies of the securi-
ties laws of the U.S. generally do not conflict with policies offoreign
states. In other areas, most particularly antitrust law, the courts have
frequently struggled with the doctrine of comity in the face of a direct
policy conflict with foreign law.
237 See id at 209 ('As the securities markets become more international, law enforce-
ment problems will become more severe and more complex.").
238 Id.
239 See, for example, Matson, Note & Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 161-62 (cited in
note 7) (critiquing the "broad, indeterminate and unrestrained reach of the [jurisdictional]
tests," especially the liberal version). See also id at 171 ("Little is gained and much is
sacrificed as courts attempt to extend the reach of United States securities laws to cover
actors and transactions that are increasingly international."); Murano, 2 Intl Tax & Bus
Law at 315 (cited in note 55) ("Despite the tendency in some courts to enlarge the scope of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the federal courts should remain within the limits established
in Leasco and in Bersch I Vencap so as to avoid any conflict with established standards of
international law."). For a general discussion of the narrow conduct tests, see Part II C 1.
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3. Encouraging high standards of conduct.
Finally, it is appropriate for a court making a jurisdictional
decision to consider the general aim of encouraging ethical securi-
ties transactions.2 4' A broad reading of the conduct test reinforces
the integrity of the markets, an aim that the Act sought to en-
courage.241 The unprecedented globalization of the markets has
increased both the potential for and seriousness of securities
fraud.242 If United States courts assert jurisdiction narrowly when
transnational securities transactions are so common, they may
inadvertently undermine the trust in markets that the Congress
of 1934 sought to rebuild through the enactment of the Exchange
Act.
243
The objection critics would likely raise to this argument is
that "promoting high standards of conduct"244 is such an unbri-
dled, subjective concept that courts will enlist it to assert jurisdic-
tion over any case involving extraterritorial fraud. A court could
readily manipulate the fact pattern of a case before it to find that
a jurisdictional grant would encourage high behavioral stan-
dards, regardless of the connection between the transaction and
United States. This consideration, then, involves nothing more
than a powerful discretionary tool disguised as a policy factor
that judges might use to reach a desired outcome.
As with the comity argument, this contention overlooks the
fact that policy considerations do not supplant jurisdictional
tests. Although the dynamic reading points to a broad version of
the conduct test, it does not eliminate the need for such a test
240 See SEC v Kasser, 548 F2d 109, 116 (3d Cir 1977) (discussing the "high standards
of conduct" policy factor in the context of transactions, investors, and markets within the
United States).
241 See Part I A.
242 See Kauthar SDN BHD v Sternberg, 149 F3d 659, 667 (7th Cir 1998) (acknowledg-
ing the importance of the policy factors considered by Kasser and noting that "we would do
serious violence to the policies of these statutes if we did not recognize our Country's
manifest interest in ensuring that the United States is not used as a 'base of operations'
from which to 'defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers,'" an interest "amplified by
the fact that we live in an increasingly global financial community") (internal citation
omitted).
243 See Murano, 2 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 300 (cited in note 55):
[Iun light of the substantial increase in the number of securities transac-
tions involving persons or events linked with foreign countries, the extra-
territorial application of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act has be-
come essential to protect domestic markets and domestic investors. With-
out such extraterritorial application, the remedial goals that the securi-
ties laws were designed to effectuate would be undermined.
244 Kasser, 548 F2d at 116.
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altogether. While the aim of promoting the integrity of securities-
related conduct may appear overly broad, the jurisdictional tests
appropriately constrain it by requiring some connection between
domestic conduct and the resulting fraud.245
CONCLUSION
If the Congress of 1934 could have foreseen the emergence of
transnational securities dealings, it might have explicitly dis-
cussed the extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions
within the Exchange Act. That legislature was more concerned
with the state of the domestic economy than with predicting the
future, making judicial reliance on its aims anachronistic. Be-
cause both the statutory text and its legislative history are incon-
clusive, dynamic interpretation allows courts to openly consider a
third element: the context in which the Exchange Act currently
operates. In the wake of economic globalization, sound policy fa-
vors giving courts the flexibility to grant jurisdiction liberally un-
der the conduct test.
245 See Part II C 2.
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